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THE 1971 PROTOCOL OF GUATEMALA CITY
TO FURTHER AMEND THE 1929
WARSAW CONVENTION
RENE H. MANKIEWICZ*
The Protocol of Guatemala City, signed on March 8, 1971,
further amends the 1929 Warsaw Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air. Pro-
fessor Mankiewicz discusses the scope and meaning of the new
provisions of the Protocol and traces the reasons for the modifica-
tions in the original Convention. The primary alteration in the sys-
tem established by the Warsaw Convention, and its first amending
Protocol signed at The Hague in 1955, is a new regime of strict
liability; an increase in the limits of recovery, particularly in the
case of the death or injury of a passenger; and provisions to make
the new limit "unbreakable." In addition, Professor Mankiewicz
details amendments to certain other articles including those dealing
with jurisdiction, passenger tickets, baggage checks and liability for
delay. In his conclusion, the author suggests that the lengthy and
involved process leading to these amendments could have been
avoided simply by following the example established for the car-
riage of goods under the Convention; that is, by the passenger
obtaining insurance if he considered the original limits insufficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Some Background FeaturesT O PUT the significance and scope of the Guatemala Protocol
in proper perspective, it might be convenient to recall the
events that led to its adoption.! The Convention for the Unification
* Professor of Law, University of Paris I-Pantheon-Sorbonne, France; Mem-
ber, Board of Advisors, THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE.
'See generally, Symposium on the Warsaw Convention, 33 J. Am L. & COM.
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of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air signed
at Warsaw on October 12, 1929, is one of the most successful con-
ventions for the unification of private law. It presently applies in
ninety-nine states ' and governs domestic air carriage in many
countries. The Warsaw Convention was amended for the first time
by The Hague Protocol of September 28, 1955, which increased
the limit of liability in case of death of or personal injury to a
passenger by 100 per cent, redefined the case of unlimited liability
of the carrier, modified the rules relating to the content and de-
livery of passenger tickets and baggage checks, and introduced
other minor amendments. The hope that the Protocol would be
rapidly ratified by all states parties to the original Convention was
not fulfilled. The Protocol came into force on August 1, 1963, and
as of October 31, 1971, had been ratified by seventy-five states.'
As is well known, the United States refused to ratify the Protocol
because of the increased limit, to which it had agreed at The Hague,
was finally considered too low."
As is the case with all uniform law conventions, the Warsaw
Convention had genetic defects that resulted in contradictory deci-
sions by national courts Courts in the United States encountered
an additional difficulty because they held that the Convention did
not provide a "cause of action. ' Consequently, they applied their
rules of conflicts of law to determine who are, in accordance with
article 24, paragraph 2 of the Convention, "the persons who have
the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights." As a
518 (1967); International Review-International Civil Aviation Organization,
33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 689 (1967).
2 As of August 1, 1972, according to information published by ICAO on the
basis supplied by the Polish Government, depository of the Convention and The
Hague Protocol.
l1d.
" For the complete story of the non-ratification of the Protocol and the de-
nunciation of the Convention by the United States, see Lowenfeld and Mendel-
sohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497
(1967). See also, Mankiewicz, The Judicial Diversification of Private Uniform
Law Convention, 1972 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 718.
' For an analysis of, and the reasons for, these inherent defects see Mankie-
wicz, Le sort de la Convention de Varsovie en droit 9crit et en common law,
1961 MLANGES EN L'HONNEUR DE PAUL ROUBIER 103 (v. II).
6 For a penetrating analysis of the problems encountered by the United States
courts, see Calkins, The Cause Of Action Under the Warsaw Convention, 26 J.
AIR L. & COM. 217, 323 (1959).
GUATEMALA PROTOCOL
result, American courts would frequently have to apply foreign
law that is less favorable than the domestic law to the injured
American citizen or resident, or his dependants or personal repre-
sentatives.!
One method used by the United States courts to avoid the ap-
plication of the Convention and its limitation of liability was to
find that the passenger's ticket did not comply with article 3, para-
graph 1, sub-paragraph (e) whenever the "statement required by
that rule that the carriage is subject to the rules relating to liability
established by this Convention" was printed on the ticket in micro-
scopic characters. In these cases, the American courts held that the
passenger was not given adequate "notice" of the limitation of
liability established by the Convention.' These decisions, not fol-
lowed by foreign courts, except recently by the Superior Court of
Montreal,9 and widely criticized in legal writings, are surprising
since it is a well established rule in the United States that the con-
ditions set forth in properly filed tariffs are applicable to passengers
even though unknown to them."0
After the United States had notified its intention to withdraw
from the Warsaw Convention, effective May 15, 1966, the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization and the International Air
Traffic Association immediately took steps to reach an agreement
on a higher limit of liability in case of the death of or injury to a
passenger in the hope this would induce the United States to remain
a party to the Warsaw Convention. The non-application of the
Warsaw Convention by the United States would have resulted in
unlimited liability to all international air carriers when sued in
American courts in situations in which the injury or death resulted
from the carrier's negligence that, for all practical purposes, would
always be presumed under the rules of res ipsa loquitur.
IE.g., Ross v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 299 N.Y. 88, 4 Av. Cas. 17,682
(1949), cert. denied sub. nom., Froman v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 4 Av.
Cas. 17,682; Komlos v. Air France, 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd,
209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953).
1 Lisi v. Altalia-Linee Aeree Ataliane, 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
af0'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966); Egan v. Kollsman Instr. Corp., 21 N.Y.2d
160, 234 N.E.2d 199, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039
(1968).
9Montreal Trust Co. v. Canadian Pacific Air Lines Limited, 12 Av. Cas.
17,197 (Sup. Ct. Montreal, Quebec 1971).
1"Martin v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 11 Av. L. Rep. 18,231 (Pa. Super.
June 22, 1971); Mao v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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When no agreement on a revision had been reached by the
states parties to the Convention, the Civil Aeronautics Board, after
consultation with major international airlines represented by IATA,
issued an order on May 13, 1966, that provided for strict liability
of the carrier in case of the death of or personal injury to a pas-
senger and set a limit of 58,000 dollars and 75,000 dollars, re-
spectively, for international air voyages originating, stopping or
terminating in the United States.1 There upon the United States
withdrew its notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention.
B. The Breakthrough at the Seventeenth Session of the ICAO
Legal Committee.
After several unsuccessful meetings held during the next four
years12 under the auspices of ICAO, a tentative agreement was
reached at the Seventeenth Session of its Legal Committee. 3 At that
session the delegate of New Zealand, with the consent of members
of the British Commonwealth and certain European states, pre-
sented a "package deal" that reflected the United States "minimum
position." This proposal was adopted as follows:14
1. Strict liability in the case of death of or injury to a passenger,
contributory negligence being the only defense admitted. (Adopted
25 to 6).
2. Increase of the limit of liability for death of or personal in-
jury to a passenger to 100,000 dollars. (Adopted 18 to 12 with 6
abstentions).
3. The limit is to be made "unbreakable in all circumstances."
(Adopted 29 to 6 with 4 abstentions).
4. Provision for automatic increases of the limit during a certain,
but not yet specified, period of time. (Adopted 20 to 13).
5. Increase of the agreed limit by 2,500 dollars per year for
"The CAB formally approved the 1966 Agreement Relating to Liability
Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and The Hague Protocol, Docket No.
17,325, Order No. E-23680, Agreement No. 18900 (CAB May 13, 1966); see also
CAB Press Release 66-61, May 13, 1966.
12 One Special Meeting (ICAO Doc. 8584, v. I and II), two sessions of a Panel
of Experts (ICAO GE-Warsaw Reports 1 and 2), two sessions of a Sub-comm.
of the ICAO Legal Comm. (ICAO LC/SC Warsaw, Reports 1 and 2) and one
session of the ICAO Legal Comm. (ICAO Doc. 8878, and for a summary of that
session ICAO Doc. 8865).




twelve years with a Diplomatic Conference, to be convened during
the fifth year of the Protocol, to decide whether to amend this ar-
rangement and another Conference convened during the tenth year
to decide whether to continue it. (Adopted 18 to 15).
6. Adoption of a "settlement inducement clause" that would
permit the allocation to the plaintiff of court costs and attorney's
fees in addition to the compensation adjudicated by the court and
which, to that extent, would go beyond the agreed limit. (Adopted
17 to 5 with 5 abstentions).
7. Amendment of the rules relating to jurisdiction by providing
for the jurisdiction of the court of the domicile or permanent resi-
dence of the passenger if the carrier has an establishment in the
same contracting state. (Adopted 21 to 14).
The complete proposal was adopted as a whole nineteen to
thirteen with six abstentions and became the basis for the Diplo-
matic Conference that met at Guatemala City during February
and March of 1971.
II. The Provisions of the Guatemala Protocol"5
The Protocol of Guatemala City, signed on March 8, 1971, has
not altered the Warsaw-Hague regime of liability of the interna-
tional air carrier for the carriage of goods. It maintains the pre-
sumption of fault and the limits of liability for carriage of goods as
agreed at Warsaw in 1929. For the carriage of passengers and
their luggage, however, the Protocol establishes a new system of
strict liability, with an "unbreakable" limit of 100,000 dollars in
case of death or injury, and supplementary indemnity at the option
of a contracting state. In addition, it provides for automatic in-
creases of the limits of liability agreed to at Guatemala City. Amend-
ments were also made in certain articles dealing with jurisdiction,
passenger tickets, baggage checks, and liability for delay in the
carriage of passengers and their baggage. Some of these amend-
ments recognize, and even endorse, the particular interpretation
given certain articles of the original Convention by American
courts.
15 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Guatemala City, March 8,
1971, official French, English, and Spanish texts in ICAO Doc. 8932 (1971).
1972]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
A. The Principle of Strict Liability and the "Unbreakable Limit"
An argument repeatedly made during the Hague Conference in
1955, and again during the numerous meetings held under the
auspices of ICAO from 1966 to 1970, was that it would be de-
sirable to establish a regime that would provide a high limit and, as
a quid pro quo, strict liability in case of the death of or bodily
injury to a passenger."l The main argument in favor of this scheme
was that strict liability with a high limit would be likely to elimi-
nate the lengthy court proceedings that frequently result in cruel
and even inhumane questioning and cross-examination of the pilots
and crew members called to testify and that saddle the parties with
exceedingly high expenses for the expert witnesses who must in-
vestigate the circumstances surrounding the accident." Moreover,
these proceedings may continue for years because of the plaintiff's
efforts to prove that the behavior of the carrier or its employees
constituted "wilful misconduct," which entails unlimited liability
under article 25, while at the same time the carrier tries to eliminate
or diminish his liability by establishing "that he and his servants
and agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage
or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures.""
The opposing view was that, even under a regime of strict lia-
bility, a high limit would be likely to result in a proliferation of
court procedures, equally undesirable, on the quantum of damages.
Furthermore, an unbreakable limit in the case of wilful misconduct
by the carrier or its employees was considered both immoral and
contrary to the public policy of most countries. This argument had
also been made at The Hague Conference and the choice had al-
ready been made between a high limit of liability and an average
limit coupled with a more strict definition of the circumstances
preventing the carrier from invoking the limit. The Hague Con-
ference had opted for the second alternative." The pressure applied
and re-enforced over the years by many states under the leadership
of the United States, however, resulted in the adoption of the first
" See Mankiewicz, The Hague Protocol to Amend the Warsaw Convention, 5
AM. J. Comp. L. 78 (1956).
17 See Kreider, A Plaintiff's View of Montreal, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 528
(1967).
18 See article 20 of the Warsaw Convention.
19 See note 15 supra.
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alternative by the Guatemala City Conference. The Guatemala
Conference decided to establish a regime of strict, or absolute,
liability for the death of or injury to a passenger, provided that the
new limit would be "unbreakable." Moreover, it was agreed that
strict liability would also apply to damage sustained in case of the
destruction or loss of, or damage to, a passenger's baggage, whether
checked or carried.
The Guatemala Conference concluded that the carrier should be
liable in the event of damage resulting from war, civil disorder,
sabotage, hijacking or other similar circumstances. The only two
defenses granted to the carrier are contributory negligence and the
state of health of the passenger or the latent defect of his baggage.
B. The Implementation of the Principle of Strict Liability
Article 17-Strict Liability. Article 17 amended the original
Convention to replace "if the accident which caused damage so
sustained" with the words "upon condition only that the events
which caused the death or injury." The first sentence of paragraph
1 of article 17, as amended, reads as follows:
1. The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or
personal injury of a passenger upon condition only that the event
which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft
or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disem-
barking.
A second paragraph was added to article 17 which reads as
follows:
2. The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of destruction
or loss of, or damage to, baggage upon condition only that the
event which caused the destruction, loss or damage took place on
board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of em-
barking or disembarking or during any period within which the
baggage was in charge of the carrier."
This new rule not only extends strict liability to loss of, or dam-
age to, baggage, but it also redefines the period during which the
damaging event must have occurred to result in the carrier's lia-
bility. Article 18 of the original Convention defined the period
differently, and this definition was retained in the Guatemala
Protocol with respect to the carrier's liability for destruction or
loss of, or damage to, cargo.
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Furthermore, under the original Convention, and as it was
amended at The Hague, the presumption of fault of the carrier or
its agents applied only to checked baggage, and not to hand-baggage
kept by the passenger. The determination of the basis of liability
with respect to hand-baggage had been left to national legislation.
But different limits for checked baggage and baggage kept by the
passenger had been established by paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 23.
At Guatemala City a new paragraph 3 was added to article 17 that
provides that strict liability and its unbreakable limits apply to both
checked baggage and "objects carried by the passenger."
Article 20-Exception from strict liability: delay in the carriage
of passengers and their baggage. The only instance in which dam-
age suffered by the passenger, either to his person or with respect
to his luggage, that is not subject to absolute liability is damage
resulting from delay. Thus the Guatemala Protocol maintains the
old system of presumption of fault against the carrier or its agents
for such damage; but the amendments to article 25 and 25A 2'
exclude any possibility of their liability becoming unlimited. Never-
theless, the establishment of absolute and strictly limited liability
necessitated certain drafting changes in the rules of article 20 re-
lating to delay.
Article 20, as amended at The Hague in 1955, had only one
paragraph that provided for complete exoneration of the carrier,
"if he proves that he and his agents had taken all necessary meas-
ures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible to him or them
to take such measures." Since under the new scheme that rule ap-
plies either to delays of the carriage of passengers and baggage or
for the loss of, or damage to, cargo, article 20 was divided into
two paragraphs-the first applying to the carriage of passengers
and their baggage, and the second for the carriage of cargo.
C. Defenses Against Strict Liability
Article 17--State of health of the passengers and defect or vice
of baggage. Article 17, paragraph 1 was amended to provide that
the carrier, "is not liable if the death or injury resulted solely from
the state of health of the passenger." Because of the use of the word
"solely," it is submitted that the carrier does not escape liability if
20 See discussion of article 25 and 25a infra.
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the state of health of the passenger was only contributing to the
damage. Similarly, the second sentence of the new paragraph 2 of
article 17 provides that the carrier is not liable "if the damage
resulted solely from the inherent defect quality or vice of the bag-
gage." There is no parallel to these rules in the original Con-
vention or in The Hague Protocol. It is generally agreed, however,
that "force majeure" was a defense under article 20, paragraph 1
of the original Warsaw Convention, and therefore was believed to
apply to damage caused solely by an inherent defect of the luggage.
Article 21-Contributory Negligence. The introduction of abso-
lute liability did not require amending article 21 once it was agreed
that contributory negligence would remain a good defense."' This
article, however, has been redrafted for two reasons. First, in 1929,
when the Warsaw Convention was drafted, contributory negligence
was a complete bar to recovery in some countries, while elsewhere
it merely mitigated the recoverable damages. To accommodate both
situations, the original article 21 provided that in case of contrib-
utory negligence "the court may, in accordance with the provisions
of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his
liability." Because most national laws have since been amended to
abolish contributory negligence as an absolute defense, the Guate-
mala Protocol redrafted article 21, paragraph 1 to make complete
or partial exoneration of the carrier compulsory, leaving, however,
the courts free to apportion liability between the carrier and the
passenger.
The second reason for the revision was that article 21 had been
poorly drafted. It referred to the negligence of "the injured per-
son,"" an expression that, strictly construed, referred only to the
person having suffered damage. This resulted in barring an effective
defense of contributory negligence when the damage action was
brought by a person claiming damage by reason of the death of or
injury to a passenger. The new wording of article 21 makes it clear
21 Opponents of the retention of that defense argued that it had no place in
a system of absolute liability because "contributory negligence" recognizes and
evaluates the respective degrees of fault of the tortfeasor and the injured person,
and strict liability is not reckoning any fault of the former. Hence, in a system of
strict or absolute liability, "contributory negligence," if admitted at all as a de-
fense, ought to mean any behavior of the plaintiff which has contributed to the
damaging event or increased the damage cause.
21 "Personne lesee" in the authentic French text.
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that the "negligence" that may wholly or partially exonerate the
carrier is the passenger's negligence.
D. The New Limits
Article 22-Death or Personal Injury to Passengers. The Con-
ference decided that the limit of 100,000 dollars (1,500,000 gold
francs) would apply to "the aggregate of the claims, however
founded, in respect to damage suffered as a result of the death or
personal injury of each passenger." While this wording is new,
there was apparent agreement that the limit established by article
22, paragraph 1 applied only to the aggregate of claims made by
the heirs or dependent members of the family of the fatally injured
passenger (those persons entitled under the Fatal Accident Acts in
common law countries).' The new wording as well as certain
amendments to article 24' appear to result in the new limit now
encompassing any compensation claims of any person who has
directly or indirectly suffered damage through the death of or in-
jury to the passenger and is entitled to compensation under the
applicable national law, e.g., an employer or a rescuer. If so broad-
ened, this would be quite an extraordinary extension of the scope
of the amended Warsaw Convention.'
Delay of Passengers. Paragraph 1, sub-paragraph b fixes the
limit of liability for delay "for each passenger" at 4,150 dollars
(62,500 gold francs). It is interesting to note that this rule does
not refer to "the aggregate of claims" and would therefore permit
a like maximum amount to be claimed by any third person who is
entitled to compensation under the applicable national law for
damages suffered by reason of the passenger's delay." Certainly,
2In common law countries this would apply to the persons entitled to re-
covery under the various Fatal Accidents Acts.
"4 See note 25 infra.
I With respect to annuities, the original Convention porvided that damages
could be awarded, in accordance with the law of the court, in the form of
"periodical payments." It specified in the French authentic text the "rent capital
shall not exceed that limit" namely the limit established in the proceeding sentence
of article 22. The official, but not authentic English-but not the Spanish-texts
had translated that sentence as follows: "The equivalent capital value of the said
payments shall not exceed 125,000 francs" (i.e. the limit established in article
22, paragraph (1)). The Guatemala Protocol re-establishes identity of the three
authentic texts by providing as follows: "The equivalent capital value of the said
payment shall not exceed 1,500,000 francs"; see article 22, paragraph (1) (a).
26 For example, a theatre could be a third party when an actor is injured who
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defendants would plead that these claims are completely excluded
or, seen the other way, included in the maximum limit because
of the use of the words "per each passenger." It may be equally
well argued that these words merely limit each claimant to 62,500
gold francs.
Destruction, loss, damage and delay of baggage. The limit for
destruction, loss, damage and delay of baggage is set at 1,000
dollars (15,000 gold francs) for each passenger in article 22,
paragraph 1, sub-paragraph c.'
E. Amendments Making the New Limits "Unbreakable"
As previously mentioned, a majority of delegates at the Seven-
teenth Session of the ICAO Legal Committee agreed to a system
of strict liability only on the condition that under no circumstances
may compensation be awarded that would be greater than the new
limits established in article 22, paragraph 1. To achieve this goal,
the Protocol of Guatemala City amended articles 22, 24, 25, and
25A to make the limits unbreakable. Amendments to articles 3
and 4, although made for other reasons, are to the same effect.
Article 22-Elimination of more favorable stipulations. Article
22, paragraph 1 was partially amended by inserting in the new sub-
paragraph a the words "the aggregate of the claims, however
founded, in respect of damage suffered as a result of the death of
personal injury of each passenger." A further amendment to article
22, paragraph 1 deletes the sentence "[n]evertheless, by special
contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit,"
which, incidently, had been used as an alibi for the previously
mentioned order of the Civil Aeronautics Board."
It is understandable, and altogether necessary, that article 32
remained unchanged and provides that "[a]ny clause contained in
the contract and the special arrangements entered into before the
damage occurred" that purport to infringe or by-pass "the rule laid
down by this Convention . . . shall be null and void." But it is
difficult to understand why more favorable arrangements between
was to perform, or the vendor or buyer of a machine that requires the injured
plaintiff to assemble it.
27 See note 19 supra.
"See note 10 supra.
19721
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the carrier and the passenger are now forbidden as a consequence
of the elimination of the last sentence of article 22, paragraph 1,
unless it is assumed that the passenger and his dependents shall
under no circumstances be permitted to obtain compensation in an
amount higher than the "unbreakable limit." On the other side, it
will be noted that the amendment efficiently prevents governments
and airline associations from ordering carriers to promise in their
tariffs compensation higher than the maximum established by the
Guatemala Protocol,"' as was done under the CAB order of May
1966 with respect to the Warsaw-Hague limits. If such a promise
is made, however, in an individual contract, through published
tariffs or otherwise, can one expect the airline to plead the defense
provided by the deletion of the last sentence of article 22, para-
graph 1 or by article 24, as amended, namely, that one cannot
raise the limit by "special contract"? Or further that the court will
uphold such a defense?
Article 25 and 25A-Exclusion of unlimited liability in case of
wilful misconduct. Both Article 25, which had undergone impor-
tant drafting amendments at The Hague Conference, and article
25A, added by that Conference, provide for unlimited liability of
the carrier and its servants and agents when the damage resulted
from an act or omission "done with the intent to cause damage or
recklessly and with the knowledge that damage would probably
result"; the carrier, however, was liable for the acts or omissions of
its servants or agents only if they acted within the scope of their
employment. These provisions applied both to the transportation
of passengers and their luggage, and to the transportation of goods.
At the Guatemala Conference the two articles were amended to
apply only to damage arising during carriage of cargo.
Article 24-Actions in tort and in contract. Article 24 of the
1929 Warsaw Convention, which had not been amended at The
Hague in 1955, stipulates that any action for damages "however
founded" could only be brought "subject to the conditions and
limits set out in this Convention." The main purpose of the words
"however founded" is to insure that if the Convention is construed
as dealing with only the contractual liability of the carrier, then the
29 This was done by Order No. E-23680 (CAB May 13, 1966) with respect
to the limits of the Warsaw-Hague scheme.
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plaintiff cannot bypass the "conditions and limitations set forth
therein" by bringing a tort action, and vice versa." Although article
24, paragraph 1 was amended at Guatemala City, this rule still
applies to carriage of cargo. But the Guatemala Protocol specifies
the meaning of the words "however founded" with respect to ac-
tions for damages arising from the carriage of passengers and
baggage, by adding the following wording: "whether under this
Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise."
The authors of the Guatemala Protocol were visibly concerned
with the possibility of inventive judges or astute plaintiffs finding
methods of circumventing the Warsaw Convention by construing
the "real" meaning of its articles. To frustrate these temptations, the
authors added the following peremptory sentence to article 24,
paragraph 2: "Such limits of liability constitute maximum limits
and may not be exceeded, whatever the circumstances which gave
rise to the liability."
The meaning of the words "otherwise" and the phrase "what-
ever the circumstances which gave rise to the liability" may be-
come very controversial questions of interpretation, especially in
the light of the aforementioned amendment to article 22, paragraph
1, sub-paragraph b relating to "the aggregate of the claims, how-
ever founded."
Under a literal interpretation, which indeed appears consonant
with the natural meaning of the words, they apply to "any claim
whatsoever" arising from the death of or injury to a passenger,
with the result that all claims are governed by the conditions and
limitations of the Warsaw Convention and that the carrier is not
obliged, on account of the death of or injury to any passenger, to
pay compensation per passenger in higher amounts than the estab-
lished limit in article 22, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph a irrespective
of the number of claimants and their cause of action. Since the
Warsaw Convention does not determine "who are the persons who
have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights,"3'
it would follow from that construction under their applicable na-
tional law, an employer could claim compensation for damages
0 On the legal basis of the carrier's liability under the Warsaw Convention,
see notes 5 and 6 supra; Marnkiewicz, Charter and Interchange of Aircraft and
the Warsaw Convention, 1961 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 707.
1See article 24, paragraph 2, where these words are taken from the original
Convention.
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for the injury to or death of his employee, or likewise a rescuer
for damages suffered during the rescue, then these claimants must
compete with the persons entitled under Fatal Accident Acts or
similar legislation, for an allocation of the maximum compensation
that can be accorded under the amended Convention. This would
also mean that the Convention not only unifies, and incidentally
amends if necessary, the national law of international air carriers'
liability but also directly or indirectly modifies the general tort law
of states that ratify, or adhere to, the Guatemala Protocol. This
writer believes on the evidence of the "travaux preparatoires" of
the original Convention that this would go far beyond the scope
of the Convention as determined by its authors. They had no in-
tention whatsoever to deal with general contract or tort law of
national states, 2 but merely intended to equitably allocate the
"risks of air navigation" among air carriers and their clients. If
this is a correct interpretation of the purpose and scope of a con-
vention "for the unification of certain rule relating to international
carriage by air," then a more restrictive interpretation must be put
on the words inserted in article 24 and on the words "however
founded" introduced in article 22, paragraph 1.
Article 30A-Right of recourse against third persons. Whatever
the Convention provides with respect to claims legally made against
the carrier and its servants or agents by passengers and their repre-
sentatives, or eventually by third persons, there seems to be no
doubt that the Convention's rules do not deprive the carrier nor its
servants and agents of the rights they may have against anybody for
recovery of the damage they have suffered as a consequence of the
events that resulted in damage to, or the death of, the passengers
and other persons. Needless to say, their possible damage is di-
minished through the limitation of compensation owned by them
under the Convention. Nevertheless, the authors of the Guatemala
Protocol found it necessary to add a new article 30A in the Con-
vention:
Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the question whether a
person liable for damage in accordance with its provisions has the
right of recourse against any other person.
"Thus the Convention does not deal with substantive conditions of the con-
tract, as opposed to formal conditions, error of the parties and beneficiary clauses.
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If the person liable under the Convention's provisions is not the
air carrier (or its servant or agent), who is? Further, why should
the Warsaw Convention, even as amended at Guatemala City,
take care of such person?
Article 3 and 4-The form and content of the ticket and the
baggage check. Articles 3 and 4 as amended at The Hague in 1955
provide that the passenger ticket and the baggage check (if not
combined with a passenger ticket) must contain a "notice" relating
to the limitation of liability under the Warsaw Convention, when
applicable; if the carrier permits a passenger to embark without a
ticket, or baggage check, having been delivered or if the ticket or
baggage check does not include the notice afore-mentioned, the
carrier's liability is unlimited. The corresponding provisions of the
original 1929 Convention have produced strange decisions as a
consequence of the courts' intention to "jump" the limits of lia-
bility that were considered too low or otherwise unsatisfactory.'3
To entrench the principle of "unbreakability" of the limit of lia-
bility in case of death or injury to a passenger, the Guatemala
Protocol deletes the rules of unlimited liability from articles 3 and
4, as amended at The Hague. But it goes even further: to eliminate
any new suprises by "creative" interpretation of the provisions
refering to the "statement," or "notice," required under articles 3
and 4, those provisions were also deleted.
These amendments have the advantage of permitting delivery of
the ticket or baggage check on board the aircraft, as is often done
on commuter flights, and also of accommodating the already fore-
seeable trend towards automatic ticketing. This was made quite
clear by the addition of new paragraphs 2 in articles 3 and 4 that
"any other means which would preserve a record of the information
[relating to the places of departure and destination and agreed
stopping places] may be substituted for the delivery of [the pas-
senger ticket or the baggage check]." Concerning the practice oc-
casionally prevailing with respect to tickets for group or chartered
flights, a further amendment to article 3 (inserted in its paragraph
33It should be observed that the decisions in note 8 supra deal with the
original Convention that required a "statement," and not a "notice" as do the
articles amended by The Hague Protocol, which the United States has not im-
plemented.
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1) permits the issue of a "collective document of carriage" for
passengers.
F. Exceptions to the "Unbreakable Limit"
Although the limit of liability for damage resulting from death
or injury of a passenger has become "unbreakable" by the fore-
going amendments and constitutes a "maximum" compensation,
the Guatemala Protocol provides two instances in which addi-
tional amounts can be awarded to the injured passenger and to
persons claiming compensation by reason of his death or personal
injury in two instances.
Court costs and attorney's fees. To retain the entire compensa-
tion allocated by the court by the claimant in cases when the
applicable national law, as in the United States, prevents the court
from awarding to the successful plaintiff court costs and attorney's
fees, The Hague Protocol added a new paragraph to article 22
permitting these costs to be allocated in addition to the compen-
sation. This rule has been retained, although with some drafting
amendments, and is a de facto exception to the principle of the
"unbreakable" limit."
Supplementary compensation. Furthermore, despite the "un-
breakable limit," states are permitted to arrange for a supplemental
payment in addition to the compensation payable under the Con-
vention for death or personal injury of passengers. While certain
states had considered a limit equivalent to 100,000 dollars as much
too high and amounting to an unlimited liability as far as their
nationals were concerned, the United States considered it too low.
Consequently, the United States proposed, and the Conference ac-
cepted, the establishment of a supplementary compensation scheme
'The Hague rule, which is of particular significance for United States claim-
ants, has never applied to them, due to the failure of the United States to ratify
The Hague Protocol. The new paragraph (3) (c) of article 22 clarifies specifically
that these costs and reasonable fees "shall not be taken into account in applying
the limits established by the Convention" as amended at Guatemala City. The
award of costs, however, including fees, can only be made if "the claimant gives
a written notice to the carrier of the amount claimed including the particulars
of the calculation of that amount and the carrier does not make, within a period
of six months after his receipt of such notice, a written offer of settlement in an
amount at least equal to the compensation awarded within the applicable limit,"
the period of six months being extended until the time of commencement of the
action, if that is later. (Article 22(3) (b)).
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at the option of each contracting state, provided the scheme com-
plied with the following conditions of the new article 35A:
(i) "It shall not in any circumstances impose upon the carrier,
his servants or agents, any liability in addition to that provided
under this Convention."' Thus, the cost for providing supple-
mentary compensation must be borne exclusively by the "system"
itself, and the guarantee of any supplementary compensation may
not in any way alter the legal regime of liability, nor the limits
established by the Protocol.
(ii) The "compensation" shall not be financed by the carriers.
Otherwise, the carriers of the country establishing the scheme would
be at a disadvantage compared to their foreign competitors. Still,
every carrier who sells passenger tickets in a country having adopted
the compensation scheme may be required by the government of
that country to collect contributions payable by the passengers
under the applicable legislation.' This duty to collect contributions
from passengers can be imposed on every carrier, irrespective
whether it is a national of, or has its headquarters in, that state.
It is surprising, but not entirely new, that the foreign carriers
hereby become the tax collectors of the state in which they are
doing business. But they already play that role with respect to
various taxes, duties and levies, such as airport taxes or taxes on
the sale of tickets. If a carrier were to refuse to collect these taxes,
levies or contributions, it risks the cancellation of its operating
license in that state.
(iii) The supplementary compensation scheme must not only
be nondiscriminatory with respect to carriers doing business in
state, but also be nondiscriminatory to the passengers; it cannot
be established for the sole benefit of passengers who are nationals
or residents of the state introducing the scheme. Indeed, paragraph
(c) of article 35A explicitly prescribes that this scheme "shall not
give rise to any discrimination ...with regard to the passengers
concerned and the benefits available to the said passengers under
the system shall be extended to them regardless of the carrier whose
services they have used." As will be noted, no reference is made in
that article to the nationality, permanent residence or domicile of
the passenger. Furthermore, paragraph (d) of article 35A pro-
a Article 35A, paragraph (b).
31 Article 35A, paragraph 1.
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vides that persons suffering damage as a consequence of the death
or personal injury of a passenger are also entitled to the benefits
provided under the system "on the sole condition" that the pas-
senger contributed.
Article 35A is incomplete, probably because of the hasty draft-
ing. For instance, it does not deal with the question of what court
will decide whether, and to what extent, the alleged damage ex-
ceeds the unbreakable maximum limit. Has the court that allocates
the maximum permissible compensation under article 22 jurisdic-
tion to establish that the damage actually suffered is higher than the
limit? Is the additional compensation available to persons making
a claim after the maximum indemnity has been adjudicated or paid
to other claimants, possibly without court proceedings? Are all
persons entitled to compensation under the Convention, whether
strictly or extensively construed, to be equally benefited under the
supplementary scheme? Which national law is to be applied (i) to
the question of their entitlement, and (ii) more generally, to the
"heads" of recoverable damage?
G. Rules for Automatic Increases of the Limit of Liability in Case
of Death or Injury to a Passenger
The steady increase of the cost and standard of living since the
end of World Wars I and II seems to require a constant adjust-
ment of the limit of liability in the case of death or personal injury
of a passenger. The discussions that preceeded the 1955 Con-
ference of The Hague and the negotiations that followed for five
years the tentative denunciation of the Warsaw Convention by the
United States have shown the great difficulties in reaching an
agreement on an increased limit. These difficulties reflect to a large
extent the disparity of economic growth and social conditions in
the countries in which the Convention applies. To avoid compli-
cated and protracted negotiations on future increases of the limit,
the United States proposed an automatic increase of the limit. This
proposal met with great resistence by members of the ICAO Legal
Committee and its sub-committees who pointed out that article 41
of the Warsaw Convention already gives each contracting state the
right to call at any time "for the assembling of a new international
conference in order to consider any improvements which may be
made in the Convention." After the Seventeenth Session, however,
GUATEMALA PROTOCOL
the ICAO Legal Committee agreed to accept the "package deal"
providing for automatic review and periodic increase of the new
limit. The Conference at Guatemala City implemented that deci-
sion by inserting a new article 42 in the Warsaw Convention.
Under article 42, on December 31 of the fifth and tenth years
after the date of entry into force of the Protocol of Guatemala
City, the limit then in force for liability in case of death or injury
to a passenger is increased by 187,500 gold francs. Moreover,
conferences of the parties to the Guatemala Protocol are convened
during the fifth and tenth years, respectively, and may "by a two-
third majority vote of the [p]arties present and voting" decide that
the limit then in force be increased by a lesser amount. While
paragraph 2 of the new article 42 does not permit the conference
to increase the limit by an amount exceeding 187,500 gold francs,
it is submitted that a diplomatic conference composed of sovereign
states may decide whatever they want, although one may expect
that the vote of an increase above the said amount would require
unanimity since a two-thirds majority is required for an increase
below that amount.
The coming into force of the Hague Protocol had raised the
question whether the increased limit provided by that Protocol
would apply to damages caused before its entry into force but
liquidated after that date. Those who believe that the Warsaw
Convention deals with the conditions of the contract of carriage,
felt that the limit established by The Hague Protocol applies only
to damage caused after its entry into force.' One may argue on the
other side, with this writer, that the Warsaw Convention estab-
lishes in fact statutory liability for international air carriers based
on public policy considerations. In that case, the Hague limit ap-
plies to all damages not liquidated at the date of its entry into force.
The Guatemala Protocol has settled that question, at least for
the increases of the Guatemala limit at the end of the fifth and
tenth years after its entry into force, by providing in paragraph 4
of article 42 that "the applicable limit shall be that which, in ac-
cordance with the preceeding paragraphs is in effect on that date
of the event which caused the death or personal injury of the
passenger." The words "in accordance with the preceeding para-
11 Pontavice, 1971 Revue Trimestrie le de Droit Commercial no. 1; French
Supreme Court, 1967 Revue Francaise de Droit Arien 4.
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graphs" make it clear that this rule does not apply to the limit
established by the Guatemala Conference. Having dealt with the
effective date of the increases occurring afterwards, it is astonish-
ing that the Conference did not deal with the prospective effect of
the coming into force of the limit established at Guatemala City.
H. Other Amendments Made by the Protocol of Guatemala City
Jurisdiction. Under article 28 of the Warsaw Convention a dam-
age suit can be brought only in the territory of a contracting state
and "either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his
principal place of business, or where he had a place of business
through which the contract was made, or before the court of the
place of destination." This limitation of the number of courts having
jurisdiction under the Convention was intended to prevent plaintiffs
from by-passing the conditions and limitations established by the
Convention by suing in the courts of the state in whose territory
the accident occurred, but which may not happen to be a party to
the Convention; in which case its courts could not apply its pro-
visions.
In many instances, this rule makes it impossible for citizens and
permanent residents of the United States to bring their damage
suits under the Convention before an American court, and thereby
insure the application of the domestic law of the United States for
the determination of the "persons and their rights" mentioned in
article 24 of the Convention. Furthermore, United States courts
are somewhat reluctant to admit that the dependents and personal
representatives of an American passenger killed in an aircraft ac-
cident abroad are prevented by article 28 of the Convention from
suing the foreign airline before a court in the United States. Some
courts avoided this situation either by finding that although the
foreign carrier did not have an "establishment" in the United States
as required by that article, the carrier at least had a place of busi-
ness there, or by finding it had been represented in the United
States by the American airline or travel agent who had sold ticket.
The courts also held that the foreign airlines could be used in any
court in the United States having jurisdiction under its local law,
provided the place relevant under article 28 was situated in the
United States." While the proposal to give jurisdiction to the court
1 See e.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 219 F.
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either of the domicile of the claimant (who, in many cases, may
not be the passenger) or alternatively, of the domicile of the
passenger" met with hostility, the Conference of Guatemala City
agreed to amend article 28 by also giving jurisdiction to the court,
if in the territory of a contracting state, within which the carrier
has an establishment if the passenger has his domicile or perma-
nent residence in the same state.
Carriage of military personnel on chartered aircraft. The United
States encountered certain difficulties with the application of the
Warsaw Convention to the transportation of military personnel by
civil aircraft chartered by the Military Air Transport Command,
since the Convention applies to all carriage that is "international"
within the meaning of article 1, except the carriage of mail and
postal packages."0 Under the Additional Protocol to article 2 each
party to the Convention can declare at the time of ratification or
adhesion that the Convention shall not apply "to international trans-
portation by air performed directly by the [s]tate. . . ." Had the
United States ratified that Protocol, transportation of military per-
sonnel by civil aircraft chartered by military authorities would still
be governed by the Convention because this transportation is not
"directly" performed by the government."
To permit this transportation to be exempted from the applica-
tion of the Warsaw Convention, the Guatemala Conference de-
cided to provide, as did The Hague Protocol, which the United
States has not ratified, that a state may "at any time declare by
notification addressed to the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion that the Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955,
and at Guatemala City, 1971, shall not apply to the carriage of
persons and cargo for its military authorities on aircraft, registered
Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 983 (1966); Chankalian v. Aerovias Quisqueyana, 10 Av. Cas. 17,353
(1967); Gordon v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 284 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Nassau Co. 1967);
Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203 N.E.2d 640, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249
(1964).
-" See Mendelsohn, A Conflict of Laws Approach to the Warsaw Convention,
33 J. AIR L. & COM. 624 (1967); ICAO Legal Committee, Minute and Docu-
ments, 17 Sess., 8878-LC/36 (1970).
' See article 2 of original Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955.
41Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 816 (1965); Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th
Cir. 1965).
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in that [s]tate, the whole capacity of which has been reserved by or
on behalf of such authorities"; the notification may be withdrawn at
any time. 2
Consequential miscellaneous amendments. Since the original
Warsaw Convention had established a single system of liability for
the carriage of passengers and their registered luggage as well as
for the carriage of cargo, some of its articles deal simultaneously
with both types of transportation. The same single system applies
to The Hague Protocol. But the Guatemala Protocol has intro-
duced a dual liability regime by adopting a new system of strict
liability for the carriage of passengers and their luggage. Hence, it
became necessary to make purely drafting changes in some of the
articles relating both to carriage of passengers and luggage and that
of cargo.'
I. Application of the Guadeljara Convention
At various times, there have been differences of opinion with
respect to which carrier is liable under the Warsaw Convention
when the transportation is not performed by the carrier with whom
the passenger has made the contract of carriage, e.g., the charterer
or lessee of the aircraft." While the majority of scholars and courts
believe that either carrier can be sued under the Warsaw Conven-
tion, ' it was considered convenient to state explicitly this conclu-
sion in a Convention supplementary to the Warsaw Convention
signed at Guadeljara on September 18, 1961. The rules of that
Convention have been made applicable to carriage by air under
the Warsaw Convention by article XXV of the Guatemala Protocol,
which specifically provides that, as between the parties to the
Protocol that are also parties to the Guadeljara Convention, "any
reference to the 'Warsaw Convention' contained in the Guadeljara
Convention shall include reference to the Warsaw Convention as
amended at The Hague, 1955, and at Guatemala City, 1971."
4" This had been done by The Hague Protocol, which the United States had
not ratified, see article 27, paragraphs 1(b), and 2.
"Pure drafting amendments occurred in articles 18, 20, 22, 24, 25 and 25A.
See also V, VI, VII, IX, XX and XXI of the Guatemala Protocol.
"E.g., the charteror or lessee of the aircraft.
'Mankiewicz, Charter and Interchange of Aircraft and the Warsaw Con-
vention, 1961 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 707.
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J. Ratification and Entry into Force of the Protocol
Originally only states members of the United Nations or any of its
specialized agencies could sign, ratify or adhere to a Convention
concluded under the auspices of the ICAO. The Guatemala Con-
ference, however, following a precedent established in December
1970 by the Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft," decided that the Protocol shall be open and can be
ratified by "all [s]tates [m]embers of the United Nations or of any
of the Specialized Agencies, or of the International Atomic Energy
Agency or [p]arties to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, and by any other [sitate invited by the General Assembly
of the United Nations to become a party to the Protocol."'
The Guatemala Protocol, like The Hague Protocol, requires
thirty ratifications for its coming into force. As mentioned before,
the expectation that, once The Hague Protocol was ratified by thirty
states, all other states parties to the original Warsaw Convention
would follow suit, was not fulfilled after the United States refused
to ratify that Protocol. Consequently, international air carriage is
now governed by two slightly different treaties or, if neither ap-
plies, by national laws. The Guatemala Conference wished to avoid
a further deterioration of the situation that would occur if the new
Protocol came into force in thirty states while not being applied
by the states that are the leaders in the field of international civil
aviation. Therefore, article 20 provides that the Protocol comes
into force, after the deposit of the thirtith instrument of ratifi-
cation, only on the condition that the airlines of five of the ratifying
states provide "[forty per cent] of the total international scheduled
air traffic of the airlines of the members [s]tates of the International
Civil Organization in 1970." The total international scheduled air
traffic is to be calculated on the basis of passenger-kilometers ac-
cording to the statistics for the year 1970 published by the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization.
K. Coordination of, and Conflicts of Law Between, the Warsaw
Convention, The Hague Protocol and The Guatemala Protocol
The Guatemala Protocol contains only the amended text of those
4 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1970, ICAO Doc. 8920 art. 11.
"' See article XVII.
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articles of the original Convention that have been modified by it,
and does not reproduce the articles amended by The Hague Protocol
nor the articles of the Convention that have never been modified.
Hence, the ratification of the Guatemala Protocol does not pro-
duce any practical effect if ratified by a state not already a party
to either The Hague Protocol or the Warsaw Convention. To pre-
vent that state from having to deposit three different instruments of
ratification (two of which would have to be deposited with the
government of Poland, and the third with the ICAO) article XIX,
paragraph 2 provides that "ratification of this Protocol by any
[s]tate which is not a [p]arty to the Warsaw Convention or of any
[s]tate which is not a [plarty to that Convention as amended at
The Hague, 1955, shall have the effect of accession to the
Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955, and at
Guatemala, 1971."
While article XVII of the Guatemala Protocol provides that "as
between the [p]arties to the Protocol," the Warsaw Convention as
amended at The Hague, 1955, and this Protocol "shall be inter-
preted together as one single instrument and shall be known as the
Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955, and at
Guatemala City, 1971"; nevertheless, the fact remains that each
of the three instruments has a different scope of application. Each
instrument applies only to international carriage that begins and
terminates in a state party to that instrument, in accordance with
article 1 of the 1929 Convention and articles XVII and XVI, re-
spectively, of The Hague and Guatemala Protocols. A number of
conflicts of law problems could therefore arise if a carriage originates
in a state that is a party to the 1929 Convention but terminates in a
state party to The Hague Protocol (i.e. The Warsaw Convention
as amended at The Hague, 1955); or where the point of departure
is in a state party to the Convention and the point of destination
in a state party to the Guatemala Protocol, (i.e. the Warsaw Con-
vention as amended at The Hague, 1955, and at Guatemala City,
1971); or furthermore, where the transportation originates and
terminates in states, one of which is a party to The Hague Protocol
and the other a party to the Guatemala Protocol.
The authors of the Guatemala Protocol have eliminated an
appreciable number of these possible conflicts of law by providing
in article XVI that the Convention, as amended at The Hague and
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at Guatemala City, applies only to carriage that begins and termi-
nates in a state that is a party to the Guatemala Protocol, or is a
round trip originating in that state with an agreed stopping place
in any other state. This rule, when applied in conjunction with
article 17, has the following consequences: If either the place of
departure or the place of destination is situated in a state party to
the 1929 Convention and the other in a state party to The Hague
or Guatemala City Protocols, the carriage falls within the scope of
the 1929 Convention; similarly, the Convention, as amended at
The Hague, 1955, applies to any carriage that either begins (or
ends) in a state party to The Hague Protocol or terminates (or
begins in a state party to the Guatemala Protocol.
In spite of the ingenious solution adopted by article 16 of the
Guatemala Protocol, which incidentally, has its counterpart in
article 17 of The Hague Protocol, conflicts may still arise in spe-
cific situations between the 1929 Convention and the two Protocols
as well as between the latters themselves. As shown previously,"
the number of these conflicts will greatly increase if a party ratifying
the Protocol of Guatemala City would at the same time denounce
the 1929 Convention, the 1955 Hague Protocol, or both of them.
L. Rules on the Interpretation of the New Protocol
The careful reader of the three instruments will immediately
notice they do not always use the same terminology. The word
"goods" used in the original Convention has been replaced by the
word "cargo"; "bodily injury" has become "personal injury"; and
so forth. At first glance, this may not appear to be particularly im-
portant because there exists only one authentic text, in French, of
the 1929 Convention; but similar changes have occurred in the
French texts of the three instruments." To avoid unnecessary and
unwanted difficulties in the construction of the texts raised by these
changes in terminology or wording, a final clause of the Guatemala
City Protocol, taken from the Hague Protocol, provides that "in
case of inconsistency, the text in the French language, in which
language the Warsaw Convention of 12 October 1929 was drawn
up, shall prevail."
See note 39 supra.
49 Conflicts entre la Convention de Varsovie et le Protocole de La Haye,
1956 REVUE GENERALE DE L'AIR 239.
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M. Authentic Texts and Depository of the Protocol
Prior to the Convention on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft signed
in December 1970, air law conventions concluded under the aus-
pices of the ICAO were drafted in authentic texts in English,
French and Spanish, the working languages of the Organization.
For the Convention of 1970 there also exists an authentic text in
the Russian language, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hav-
ing meanwhile become a member of the ICAO. For technical
reasons, no authentic text in the Russian language could be opened
for signature at Guatemala City; therefore the only authentic texts
signed were in English, French and Spanish. But another final
clause of the Protocol provides that "the [ICAO] shall establish an
authentic text of this Protocol in the Russian language."
The Hague Protocol was deposited with the Polish Government
since it amends the Warsaw Convention, which was also deposited
with that government. The Conference of Guatemala City, however,
decided that the new Protocol should be deposited with the ICAO.
III. FINAL REMARKS
Two final remarks conclude this analysis of the Protocol signed
in Guatemala City. First, if the present disturbances of the mone-
tary exchange lead to a reevaluation of the price of gold, the mone-
tary value of the limits of liability established at Warsaw in 1929,
at the Hague in 1955 and at Guatemala City in 1971 will ipso jure
increase. Moreover, one may expect that states will rapidly ratify
the Guatemala Protocol because any delay will postpone the "auto-
matic increases" of the liability limits established at Guatemala City,
which are to take place after the fifth and tenth years following
the entry into force of the Protocol.
This writer cannot help but wonder why one had to go through
all these lengthy negotiations and involved amendments with re-
spect to the limits of liability in the case of carriage of passengers
and their luggage while the increase of the limit of liability for the
carriage of goods was never raised. The reason for this situation is
clearly that shippers of goods who are not satisfied with the limits
established at Warsaw in 1929 regularly take out additional in-
surance for cargo shipped. Therefore, it is difficult to understand
why, instead of raising the Warsaw limit for death and injury of a
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passenger, including liability for his luggage, it was not agreed to
leave it to the individual passenger to take out flight insurance if
he considers the limits to be too low.

